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Contextualized Cosmopolitanism: Human Rights Practice in South Korea 
 
 
by Yoon Jin Shin 
 
There are three prominent criticisms directed against those engaging with human rights 
practice: First, the claim that human rights norms effectively erase the local in favor of an 
abstract universal; second, that human rights enterprises fail to appreciate its Western 
colonial continuities; and third, that the rights discourse functions predominantly in a 
top-down mode, drowning out the multitude of voices on the ground. Drawing on the 
dynamic aspects of human rights practices by and through the Constitutional Court of 
South Korea—which the paper understands as contextualized cosmopolitan human rights 
practices—this paper illustrates how such criticisms are too generalized. First, it 
illuminates the conflicts, struggles and innovations developed in the course of the court’s 
engagement with international human rights norms: illuminating how the court 
incorporates the norm as a substantive standard for rights review, while defying a simple 
priority of international human rights law in a domestic legal order. Second, it examines 
the court’s transforming self-identity reflected on and evolved through its engagement 
with foreign law and practice of human rights: observing the court’s self-emancipation 
from a traditional focus on a few influential powers to a more inclusive comparative 
practice across wider jurisdictions of the world, and its effort to establish itself as a 
regional leader in human rights jurisprudence. Third, the practice of the court shows how 
rights discourse productively internalizes the tension between local traditions and 
universal standards. Finally, the paper underlines the role of individual rights-holders in 
the above contexts and argues that the empowerment and emancipation of the individual 
is a genuine effect of rights contestation and the rights review system. Through these 
contextualized and bottom-up cosmopolitan human rights practices, local rights actors 
concretize and advances the meaning and the operation of universal human rights norms 
in their specific contexts. 
 
Key words: human rights, contextualized cosmopolitanism, international human rights law, 






There are three prominent criticisms directed against those engaging with human 
rights practice, either as human rights lawyers or as comparativists. First, the 
claim is that human rights, as they are invoked and practiced, effectively 
dominate or erase the local in favor of an abstract universal.1 Second, human 
rights and the legal disciplines celebrating their rise and spread fail to appreciate 
the Western colonial continuities that come with such a practice.2 Third, the rights 
                                                 
1 E.g., Günter Frankenberg notes, “The universal reach and claim come at a cost, though. The 
particularity of the individual complaint is never completely exhausted but take as an instance … to be 
fitted and dealt with in the all-encompassing universal scheme. And this way, many aspects the 
individual may find crucial get lost in translation.” GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, COMPARATIVE LAW AS CRITIQUE 94 
(2016). This line of criticism underlies the universal human rights vs. cultural relativism debate. See 
generally Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984). In a 
slight different angle, Frankenberg also criticizes that the process of “normalization” of real life 
suffering into the language of human rights flattens and distorts the reality and only delivers partly 
the story. FRANKENBERG, id. at 176–77, 202. A similar line of criticism is raised against traditional 
comparative law methodologies such as functionalist or structuralist approaches. FRANKENBERG, id. at 54 
(noting, “[R]ather than indulging in the social, political, economic and cultural context of law, the 
functionalist radicalizes de-contextualization by ‘cutting loose’ and ‘stripping’ the solutions generated 
by the diverse legal regimes …”, quoting KONRAD ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
36–37 (1998)). Frankenberg also critically discusses the approach taken by the Trento Group’s Common 
Core project, pointing out “[w]hile the Trentoes bravely plod through what they consider ‘natural’ facts 
and grasp the factual world out there, they resort to what Geertz would have called the ‘sterilization of 
fact,’ oblivious to their own fact-making.” FRANKENBERG, id. at 65 (footnote omitted). See also Jule Mulder, 
New Challenges for European Comparative Law: The Judicial Reception of EU Non-Discrimination Law and a 
Turn to a Multi-Layered Culturally-Informed Comparative Law Method for a Better Understanding of the EU 
Harmonization, 18 GERMAN L.J. (forthcoming, 2017) (pointing out “a common core approach, like 
functionalism, is likely to overlook relevant divergences because it tends to exclude a large number of 
facts which are not strictly legal … the question remains whether we can ever understand sterilized, 
fabricated, abstract factual scenarios removed from their social, economic, and cultural contexts”). 
2 FRANKENBERG, id. at 188 (“Since human rights law has replaced the exhausted natural rights tradition, it 
was linked to one or the other political agenda: Western anti-communism and Easter anti-imperialism, 
first; later, foreign aid/development and the promotion of democracy; and more recently humanitarian 
intervention and neo-liberal restructuring of economies. Accordingly, ‘the holy trinity’ of liberalism, 
democracy and human rights has been said to serve as the ‘West’s ideology, the credo of a new world 
order,’ … ”) (footnote omitted); FRANKENBERG, id. at 194 (“[T]he universal grasp, to preserve its allure, 
denies the Eurocentric particularity of the human rights corpus and denies its cultural specificity, …”). 
See generally MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2002); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001). See also Frankenberg’s critique on comparative law 
methodologies in terms of “cognitive control” and a Western-centered view underlying the project 




discourse in its operation is claimed to function predominantly in a top-down 
mode, drowning out the multitude of voices on the ground.3  
Drawing on the practice of human rights adjudication by the Constitutional Court 
of South Korea, the following will illustrate not that these claims are categorically 
wrong, but how such claims are too generalized. In some sense, such critiques fall 
prey to the very sensibility that is the focus of their criticisms. Frist, these 
critiques are insufficiently contextualized, and if so only selectively, rarely 
engaging closely with how rights claiming actually functions. Second, this line of 
criticism is too focused on the West and its influence (an inverse imperialism, 
perhaps, the manifestation of the bad conscience that comes with post-imperial 
sensibilities) and insufficiently attuned to struggles as they are taking place 
outside of the West. And third, the criticism is too focused on the operational mode 
taken by elite international or state actors. It tends to downplay the empowering 
function that rights claiming can have on those individuals who are marginalized 
and oppressed within their societies and the dynamic process of concretizing the 
meaning of human rights achieved through bottom-up rights practice. 
This paper discusses contextualized cosmopolitan rights practice exemplified by the 
case of the South Korean Constitutional Court, focusing on four aspects. First, it 
examines how the court engages with international law of human rights when 
adjudicating rights claims domestically. It illuminates how this national court 
understands and interprets human rights norms in relation with its domestic 
legal order, and the conflicts, struggles and innovations developed in the course of 
such engagement. Whereas the exact terms of engagement of the national with the 
                                                 
3 Human rights law is often regarded and accused as a static program unilaterally decided and imposed 
by international (predominantly Western) elite groups. E.g., FRANKENBERG, id. at 187 (“Theories of human 
rights qualify as ideologies insofar as they contain ‘prepackaged units of interpretation’ ordering the 
world and shaping the vision of how the world is or, rather, should be seen. … They are offered either 
by a dominant class or elite or by the non-dominant class or their advocates as mobilizing message to 
persuade the recipients to look at things and understand reality from the offered point of view, …”); 
FRANKENBERG, id. 195–201 (discussing human rights narratives as a modern “mythology” and a political-
educational agenda). Alienation of ordinary persons caused by human rights discourses and practices 
taken up by legal professionals is another relevant point of criticism frequently made: “The alienating 
effect … relegates rights-holders to the role of intimidated and rather ignorant bystanders who observe 




international are subject to debate, the court rejects a simple priority of 
international human rights law and casts the issue as one subject to national 
interpretative control. Second, in the court’s engagement with foreign law and 
practice of human rights, it is possible to observe an emancipation from a 
traditional focus on a few influential powers such as Japan, Germany and the 
United States to a more inclusive citation practice across wider jurisdictions of the 
world. The development reflects a transforming self-identify of the court aligning 
with its effort to establish itself as a regional leader in human rights 
jurisprudence. Third, the practice of the court shows how rights discourse 
productively internalizes the tension between local traditions and universal 
standards. Here the human rights norm serves as a critical standard triggering 
justificatory engagement—operating through the various prongs of the 
proportionality test—with local traditions and practices. Human rights practices 
that have these three features can be called contextualized cosmopolitanism: Local 
actors reflect on their specific situations in light of universal norms embodied in 
the national constitution whose meaning is concretized by engagement with the 
practices of other jurisdictions and international human rights law. Finally, 
toward the conclusion, the paper underlines the role of individual rights-holders 
in this context and argues that the empowerment and emancipation of the 
individual is a genuine effect of rights contestation and the rights review system, 
and not merely an effect imagined by international idealists or Western political 
elites. This case study provides comparative and human rights lawyers with some 
further non-western contexts to productively engage in self-criticism and do 
justice to the efforts undertaken elsewhere.  
 Contextualized Engagement with International Human Rights Law 
The creation of the Constitutional Court of Korea (the South Korean Constitutional 
Court) was one of the key elements of the historic amendment of the South Korean 
Constitution in 1987, the momentous year that Korea achieved democratization, 




dictatorship.4  Partly because Asia has no supranational human rights adjudication 
system at the regional level, constitutional courts and their equivalent bodies in 
Asia are often the only venue for ordinary citizens and non-citizens to contest 
their human rights. Under this structure, individuals in South Korea have 
frequently sought the Constitutional Court as a platform to invoke and apply 
international human rights norms as one of the grounds for their rights claims.5 
The Court has gradually become a site where international human rights law and 
constitutional law squarely meet. This section examines how the Court engages 
with international human rights law in the course of rights contestation and 
adjudication.6 The discussion will demonstrate that international human rights 
law does not operate at the domestic level in a static top-down manner as 
generally assumed or accused of, but that the international norm attains its 
meaning and place through dynamic bottom-up engagement by a local rights 
adjudication body constantly seeking for a desirable status and effect of 
international law in a domestic legal order.  
                                                 
4 For English literature surveying the history and system of constitutional courts in Asia, including 
South Korea, see generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN 
CASES (2003).  
5 Since it began operating in September 1988, the South Korean Constitutional Court has played an 
active role. As of December 2016, the Court has received 30,591 applications and decided 10,897 cases 
on the merits. The cases brought to the Court have increased gradually—362 cases in 1990, 1,060 cases 
in 2001, 1,720 cases in 2010, and 1,951 cases in 2016. Among the 2,992 cases the Court decided on the 
merits regarding the constitutionality of specific domestic law, the Court has invalidated 653 laws as 
unconstitutional, either in entirety or in part. Among the 7,866 cases decided on the merits concerning 
government actions, the Court has found 769 cases unconstitutional. The statistics of the court cases 
are regularly updated on the Court’s English website: 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/decisions/caseLoadStatic/caseLoadStatic.do. 
6 An introductory comparative research of Korean and Taiwanese constitutional court cases has been 
conducted by Wen-Chen Chang, The Convergence of Constitutions and International Human Rights: Taiwan 
and South Korea in Comparison, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. 593 (2011). Broader discussions on the subject include 
VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2013); Mattias Kumm, Democratic 
Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
IDEAS 256 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights and International 
Constitutionalism, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 233 




1.  Legal Framework and the Conventional Theory 
As is the case for many other states’ constitutions, the South Korean Constitution 
mentions the domestic legal status of international law, but in a relatively 
abstract manner. Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides: “Treaties duly 
concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the generally recognized 
rule of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic law of the 
Republic of Korea” (emphasis added). A traditional view among public law scholars 
in South Korea reads the “domestic law” in this provision to mean statutes, one of 
the five levels of domestic law in Korea—the constitution, statutes, enforcement 
decrees (issued by the president), enforcement regulations (issued by a relevant 
ministry), and local ordinances. Most Korean scholars hold the view that 
international human rights law (IHRL) is not different from other kinds of 
international law in its domestic legal status. The fact that several international 
human rights norms have achieved the status of jus cogens does not matter from 
this viewpoint. The decisive criteria is what each state’s constitution dictates. 
These scholars defend their position by relying on national sovereignty, consent-
based international treaty systems, the supremacy and autonomy of the national 
constitution, and comparison with domestic lawmaking process (noting that IHRL 
cannot have a constitution-like status since its adoption does not follow a process 
equivalent to constitutional amendment). They also point out that the text of the 
South Korean Constitution does not distinguish IHRL from other types of 
international law.7 This position implies that IHRL, along with other international 
treaties, may not serve as a standard for constitutional review, since its legal 
status is not superior to statutes. 
                                                 
7 These scholars also invoke the South Korean Constitution Addenda Article 5, providing, “Acts, 
decrees, ordinances and treaties in force at the time this Constitution enters into force, shall remain 
valid unless they are contrary to this Constitution.” They claim this provision establishes the 
supremacy of the Constitution over international law. However, a persuasive counterargument can be 
made that this clause does not preclude the possibility that international law can have a status 
equivalent to the constitution, even though it cannot override the constitution. This provision can be 
deemed to acknowledge the possibility of a pluralist legal system with IHRL and constitutional law as 




2.  Cases 
The practice of the South Korean Constitutional Court over the years indicates that 
the Court has departed from the conventional theory described above regarding 
the legal status and effect of IHRL. 
In the Foreign Industrial Trainees case, a few migrant workers, represented by a 
group of human rights lawyers, challenged the national foreign labor system. 
Until then, simple skilled migrant workers were not treated as “workers” in a 
legal sense, but were classified as “industrial trainees” and were denied the equal 
protection of labor rights and full application of the Labor Standards Act. In 2007, 
the Court held that the foreign trainee system was unconstitutional as a whole in 
violation of the right to equality of these migrant workers.8 In its reasoning, the 
Court cited relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), including the principle of non-discrimination (Art. 2) 
and the enjoyment of just and favorable working conditions (Art. 7), as an 
important reference for interpreting the equality clause of the Constitution. The 
Court specified that “the provisions of this Covenant should be taken into account 
when interpreting our Constitution.” 
The Court also frequently cites international human rights documents that do not 
have binding effect (soft law) as resources to consider for constitutional 
interpretation. In the “Comfort Women” case decided in 2011,9 the Court cited a 
report by Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, “Report on the mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in 
wartime” adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1996, and the 1998 
report by Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery 
and slavery-like practices during armed conflict, reporting on the issue of 
“comfort women” in Korea and Japan. The Court cited these documents in 
                                                 
8 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2004 Hun-Ma 670 (Aug. 30, 2007). 




determining the significance of the infringement of the rights of victims and 
holding unconstitutional the Korean government’s inaction in resolving this issue. 
The practice of citing unbinding international human rights documents began in 
earlier years for a wide range of cases. In the Teachers’ Union case decided in 1991, 
the Court discussed the relevance of the ILO/UNESCO Recommendation concerning 
the Status of Teachers (1966) in deciding the constitutionality of prohibiting 
private school teachers from enjoying the right to form and join a labor union.10 
In a 1992 case, a detainee challenged the actions taken by investigators at the 
National Security Agency who attended a meeting between the detainee and his 
counsel, during which the investigators listened in on and documented their 
conversations. The Court found this conduct unconstitutional, citing the “Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988.11 In a 
case against a law mandating that employers employ people with disabilities, the 
Court held the law constitutional, consulting the ILO Recommendation (No. 99) 
Vocational Rehabilitation (Disabled) Recommendation of 1955.12 
There are multiple cases in which the Court has shown a stronger mode of 
engagement. In Conscientious Objectors,13 a group of Korean men who were 
Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged the Military Service Act, which punishes with up 
to three years’ imprisonment anyone refusing to fulfill their obligatory military 
service. The Court explicitly reviewed whether this domestic law was in violation 
of international human rights law. The Court first pointed to Article 6 paragraph 1 
of the Constitution (“Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the 
Constitution and the generally recognized rule of international law shall have the 
same effect as the domestic law of the Republic of Korea”), and found that this 
provision declares the constitutional principle of respecting international law. The 
                                                 
10 Constitutional Court of Korea, 89 Hun-Ga 106 (Jul. 22, 1991). 
11 Constitutional Court of Korea, 91 Hun-Ma 111 (Jan. 28, 1992). 
12 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2001 Hun-Ba 96 (Jul. 24, 2003). 




Court then proceeded with a substantive review of whether international human 
rights law mandates states to recognize the right to conscientious objection, and 
answered in the negative. The majority opinion examined Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which South Korea 
joined in 1990, and pointed out that the Covenant does not specifically mention 
the right to conscientious objection in its provision on the rights to thought, 
conscience and religion. The Court mentioned in detail the interpretations by the 
UN Human Rights Committee and the earlier Commission on Human Rights that 
Article 18 of the ICCPR includes the right to conscientious objection, and these 
bodies’ recommendations to member states to recognize this right and to adopt an 
alternative service system for conscientious objectors. However, the Court held 
that their interpretations “are only recommendations, not having binding effect.” 
It also viewed that the right to conscientious objection cannot be deemed as 
customary international law either, even though several countries, including 
European states, recognize this right. The Court concluded that currently there is 
no international law guaranteeing the right to conscientious objection, so it is not 
a violation of the constitutional principle of respecting international law under 
Article 6, even though South Korea criminally punishes conscientious objectors. In 
contrast, two dissenting justices cited the UN bodies’ recommendations along with 
the established practices of other countries as grounds for its opinion that the law 
is unconstitutional in violation of the right to conscience. 
The ICCPR has been taken as a direct standard of constitutional review along with 
relevant constitutional provisions (including Article 6 and provisions on 
fundamental rights) in less prominent cases as well. In a case brought against the 
criminal law penalizing collective refusal to work by employees, the Court 
reviewed whether that provision was in violation of the ICCPR Article 8 providing 
for the right against forced labor, and found in the negative.14 In a case on the 
constitutionality of a domestic law punishing the act of issuing a bounced check 
with willful negligence, the Court reviewed whether the law violated the ICCPR 
                                                 




Article 11 (“No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil 
a contractual obligation”) and answered in the negative.15 
The above examples show how the Court engages with IHRL in the course of rights 
review. The Court has yet to articulate the exact status of IHRL in the domestic 
legal order of South Korea. However, its actual practice suggests that the Court 
regards IHRL differently from other types of international law. As exemplified 
above, the Court sometimes takes IHRL as an important reference for interpreting 
relevant constitutional provisions. In this case, non-binding international 
documents are also frequently consulted. On other occasions, the Court directly 
takes up IHRL, mostly major human rights covenants as the ICCPR, as a standard 
for rights review. In such cases, the Court usually relies on Article 6 paragraph 1 
of the Constitution as a link, reading this provision as embodying a more general 
constitutional principle of respecting international law. Through this approach of 
reasoning, IHRL is elevated from a resource of reference to a standard of review. 
This status of IHRL is contrasted with the Court’s attitude towards other types of 
treaties. The Court has repeatedly made it clear that international treaties (which 
are not human rights treaties) have the same effect as domestic statutes, and thus 
can only be an object of a constitutionality test, not a standard for constitutional 
review of other domestic law or state actions. The Court has reviewed the 
constitutional validity of such treaties in numerous cases.16 
3.  A Contextualized Cosmopolitan Rights Practice 
As demonstrated in the cases above, the actual practice of the South Korean 
Constitutional Court deviates significantly from the conventional doctrinal view. 
Even though the Court has not articulated the precise legal status and effect of 
IHRL in relation to the constitution, it is clear from its practice that the Court 
                                                 
15 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2009 Hun-Ba 267 (Jul. 28, 2011); 99 Hun-Ga13 (Apr. 26, 2001). 
16 International treaties the Court has reviewed their constitutionality include: Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization; Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; 
Agreement of Fisheries between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of 




treats IHRL as different in kind from other types of international law. While the 
current court practices are not perfectly clear or coherent, IHRL obviously 
functions either as an important reference point for constitutional rights 
interpretation or as a direct standard of constitutional review, whereas other 
types of treaties have only been the targets of constitutional review for their 
validity. The Conscientious Objectors case supports the view that the Court regards 
IHRL to hold a presumptive authority in relation to domestic law and 
constitutional interpretation.17 The Court in this case took great pains to prove 
that there is no IHRL obligating states to recognize a specific right to conscientious 
objection. If the Court had found otherwise, its decision might have reached a 
different conclusion. In the Foreign Industrial Trainees case, the Court adopted a 
weaker engagement mode but still seriously consulted the relevant provisions of 
the ICESCR as an important reference point, acknowledging the necessity to take 
into account the Covenant’s mandates when interpreting the constitution. What 
makes the Court take this unconventional position, which “Big C 
constitutionalists”18 might claim is incoherent or even unconstitutional? Why, on 
the other hand, has not the Court more clearly pronounced the relation between 
international and constitutional law and the exact difference between IHRL and 
other international law? The Court’s current practice reflects the conflicts, 
confusion and struggle that the Court has experienced in the course of engaging 
with IHRL, while fully aware of the conventional theoretical position, but at the 
same time recognizing the significance and distinctiveness of human rights 
norms as opposed to other essentially consent-based treaties. 
The current court practice suggests an example of a contextualized cosmopolitan 
rights practice. The Court recognizes that rights should be understood and 
adjudicated in the intertwined normative set of international and national law, 
                                                 
17 For discussion of the presumptive authority of international law, see e.g., Başak Çalı, THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: OBEDIENCE, RESPECT, AND REBUTTAL (2015); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International 
Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15  EUR. J. INT. L. 907 (2004). 
18 These conventional scholars’ position aligns with the “Big C constitutionalist” view elaborated by 
Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. 




and that rights bear both universality and locality, which can be realized only 
through the organic operation of IHRL and the national law.19 Through this idea 
and practice evolving around the Court’s rights adjudication, IHRL is attaining a 
constitution-like status, even in the absence of theoretical articulation or 
sophistication in Korean public law scholarship and without a relevant mandate 
by international law. The Court justices made a breakthrough in linking IHRL and 
the constitution by taking a broad interpretation of Article 6 and finding the 
underlying constitutional principle of respecting international law. This 
interpretative stretch has enabled the Court to review the constitutional validity 
of domestic law and state actions in light of international human rights norms in 
a substantive manner, while sustaining the framework of constitutional review. 
By approaching international and constitutional law in an integrated manner, the 
justices exempt themselves from responding to the questions of the precise 
hierarchal status of IHRL in the Korean constitutional order and whether the Court 
can take IHRL as a self-standing standard of rights review. Despite the absence of a 
clear constitutional text or an internationally binding norm on the status of IHRL 
in a domestic legal order, the Court, by developing its own rights practice, has 
incorporated IHRL into the national process of rights review.20 Putting aside the 
charge of theoretical imperfection that could be raised against this approach, this 
layered effort represents the Court’s understanding of the universality of human 
                                                 
19 For discussion on the cosmopolitan understanding of constitutionalism in relation with 
international law, see Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship 
between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, in Ruling the World?, supra note 6, at 263–64 
(“Cosmopolitan constitutionalism establishes an integrative basic conceptual framework for a general 
theory of public law that integrates national and international law.”); Kumm, supra note 17, at 611–12 
(“[…] the deep interdependencies between national and international law. International law is neither 
derivative, nor is it autonomous. National and international law are co-constitutive and form an 
integrative whole.”). See generally JACKSON, supra note 6 (analyzing three modes toward “the 
Transnational” and describing the mode of “convergence”); Vlad F. Perju, Cosmopolitanism in 
Constitutional Law, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 711 (2013). 
20 It is notable that some states adopt constitutional provisions more concretely stipulating the effect 
of international law in general or of certain kinds of international law. See, for example, the Dutch 
Constitution Article 94, providing, “Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be 
applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of resolutions by international 
institutions that are binding on all persons,” and the Constitution of Argentina Section 75 paragraph 22 




rights and its normative progress toward a cosmopolitan form of rights practice 
that contextualizes the rights’ universality through the domestic rights review 
process.21 The current practice of the South Korean Constitutional Court, including 
its departure from the conventional doctrinal view, and its struggle and attempt to 
accommodate IHRL as a substantive standard of review along with the 
constitution, suggest that the two levels of law can operate in harmony without a 
need to place them in order under a unitary hierarchy.22  
The fact that the Court has begun to take IHRL as a direct standard of rights 
review, not merely as a point of reference, is a notable step forward, especially as 
compared to other well-known models. The South African Constitution requires 
the court only to consider international law when interpreting its bill of rights.23 
The German Constitutional Court held that the ECHR as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights must be taken into account when the German 
court makes a decision on relevant rights.24 However, limitations also exist in 
Korean practice that might undermine the progressiveness shown by the South 
Korean Constitutional Court. It is still debatable whether the Court always takes 
engagement with IHRL as its duty. The Court typically draws on IHRL when 
                                                 
21 Understanding the role of national court in cosmopolitan terms goes in line with Mulder’s analysis 
“focusing on the judicial reception of EU harmonized law and national-European legal hybrids because 
national courts are part of an inter-community group of courts and are embedded in their own cultural 
context” and emphasizing “the national identity, self-understanding and legal consciousness 
surrounding the application of harmonized law at the national level.” Mulder, supra note 1, at. 
22 This practice hints at a model of pluralist operation of international and constitutional law in rights 
adjudication. Research on pluralist legal systems have predominantly concentrated on the European 
context, focusing on Europe’s supranational regimes and its relation to individual states’ legal orders. 
To mention just a few, CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (Matej Avbelj & Jan 
Komárek eds., 2012); Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MODERN L. REV. 317 (2002); 
Miguel Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and 
Constitutional Pluralism, in RULING THE WORLD?, supra note 6, at 356–80. See also Alec Stone Sweet, A 
Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 53 (2012). 
23 The Constitution of South Africa Art. 39 (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law. 
24 Görgülü v. Germany (2004) 2 BvR 1481/04. See Kumm, supra note 6, at 280–81; Christian Tomuschat, 
The Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights According to the German Constitutional 





applicants or their lawyers invoke the mandates of IHRL as one of the grounds for 
their rights claims. It is the Court’s duty to discuss IHRL when it is part of the 
claim; if not, an explicit engagement with IHRL still seems discretionary. In this 
regard, one may argue that the Korean approach is closer to that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court (irregularly engaging with international law) than to the German 
model which takes engagement as obligatory. However, one could also point out 
that the German “duty to consider” model concerns the relation between the 
national constitution and the ECHR, the regional human rights regime with which 
individual member states have vowed a tighter affiliation, and is not about IHRL. 
Another controversial point is the South Korean Constitutional Court’s attitude 
toward soft IHRL. The Conscientious Objectors case leaves much to debate as the 
Court discussed and dismissed as non-binding the recommendations by the 
Human Rights Committee directed to the Korean government, while the dissenting 
justices took these documents seriously. Lastly, since most constitutional rights 
claims invoke IHRL along with relevant provisions of the constitution, it remains 
unclear how the Court would respond if a rights claim were to invoke IHRL as the 
sole basis for challenging the validity of domestic law or government actions. 
Despite these limitations, insufficient coherence, and vagueness, the overall 
practice by the South Korean Constitutional Court of engaging with IHRL reflects 
the growing cosmopolitan ideas of rights conceived and embodied by a national 
actor. It is this local court and rights-claiming individuals who are constantly 
seeking to make a better sense of international law in their domestic legal context 
through contestatory and deliberative rights practices. These local actors neither 
tie themselves to the traditional dogmatic theory, nor take IHRL as a body of law 
categorically superior to national law or the constitution. Progressively linking 
IHRL and constitutional law through the expansive interpretation of Article 6 of 
the South Korean Constitution has been the Court’s own innovation empowered by 
individuals’ rights claims invoking international norms in a domestic rights 
review process. Through this engagement, the identity and the role of the Court 




jurisdiction in Asia, the Court is growing into an important player in the 
cosmopolitan practice of concretizing and contextualizing the meaning and the 
operation of universal human rights norms.25 This local story provides an 
illustration that international law does not necessarily operate in a top-down 
manner imposing on local actors a fixed set of human rights norms and programs 
decided at the international level. The concrete meaning, status and effect of 
international human rights law are constituted by local rights actors through a 
bottom-up process. Acknowledging IHRL’s quasi-constitutional status is a 
development made by domestic actors through their constant and dynamic 
engagement with the universal, under continuous normative tensions 
productively managed through a rights contestation process. International law, by 
not dictating on this matter, upholds this mode of engagement. Comparativists’ 
critiques on human rights practice as being a static, top-down, and Western 
project are not applicable to this local context.26  
 Emancipatory Engagement with Foreign Rights Practices 
1.  Trajectory of Development 
As a local rights court refers to and cites foreign human rights law and practices 
in its rights adjudication process, the court itself engages with comparative law.27 
This section examines a gradual change observed in the mode of the South Korean 
Constitutional Court’s engagement with foreign law and discusses its implications 
for comparative and human rights law critiques.   
                                                 
25 See Mulder, supra note 1 (discussing the triangular relationship of the national courts and the CJEU 
and “their shared responsibility regarding the application and interpretation of EU law” and noting 
that national courts of EU member states “thus retain a substantial responsibility for ensuring that EU 
law is properly enforced, and they become ‘decentralized EU courts’ with primary responsibility for the 
‘effect utile of EU law’”) (footnote omitted). 
26 See supra note 3. 
27 For general and comparative discussion on this matter, see generally THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
IDEAS, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.1103 (2000); Gábor 
Halmai, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 




In the Court’s earlier years (since late 1988), the Court relied predominantly on 
German practice. It regarded Germany as the most persuasive reference point for 
a wide range of issues: the initial design of the constitutional court system; the 
basic structure of constitutional rights review centered on the proportionality 
principle; detailed theories of reasoning and sentencing; individual cases decided 
by the German Constitutional Court; even technical rules employed to operate the 
system. In the course of modernizing domestic law, Korea joined the family of 
Continental/Civil law. Under the influence of the colonial history, modern Korean 
law drew heavily on Japanese law, which had earlier absorbed much of German 
law. The First Constitution of Korea, promulgated in 1948, took the Weimar 
Constitution as its primary model. Most of the first-generation leading 
constitutional law scholars in Korea studied in Germany for their doctoral degrees 
and played influential roles in founding the constitutional court system and 
relevant theories in these early years. Similarities in Civil law systems also made 
the German law cases more accessible and comprehensible. Apart from this 
historical background, to many judges and scholars in Korea as in many other 
countries, the German constitutional court system and its theories of 
constitutional review have generally been considered an advanced role model. The 
systematic feature of the German constitutional review and its organized 
structure of reasoning also made the German model easier to comprehend and 
assimilate. The early years of the Court’s foreign law engagement can be 
characterized as “predominant dependence on Germany.” Other than Germany, 
U.S. law and cases have been consulted and cited regularly with an assumption of 
their being relatively advanced in general, and especially when a particular legal 
doctrine has originated from U.S. case law. Japanese law has been frequently cited 
as well, but this was mainly because a number of Korean domestic laws were 
drafted after Japanese law, and reference was made mostly for statutory 
interpretation, not constitutional interpretation. 
As its own decisions accumulated, the Court became less dependent on the 




trends as well as specific practices in numerous countries beyond those selected 
few. It is now an established and routinized practice for the Court to conduct 
comparative research involving a broad range of states and regions. Extensive, in-
depth research on foreign rights practices is conducted by an army of nearly 
seventy young research judges. The majority of these research judges are 
appointed in their 20s or 30s, fluent in one or two foreign languages, and work 
full-time at the Court in a permanent capacity. Recently, the Court has begun to 
hire researchers other than judges who have expertise in less-researched 
jurisdictions. The main duty of these research judges is to document a substantive 
research report for each pending case. Research on relevant foreign and 
international law comprises an integral part of their reports. The Court justices 
consult these reports and take them seriously into account during their 
deliberation and adjudication processes. Most justices, usually in their 50s or early 
60s, have been educated in Korea for their entire lives and have served in 
ordinary courts or in the prosecutor’s office for decades before being appointed to 
the Constitutional Court. As ordinary court judges and prosecutors, and as law 
students before that, most of them had little exposure to transnational dimensions 
of law and little occasion to doubt a nationalist approach to the constitution. These 
justices often experience self-transformation while serving at the constitutional 
court, and their collaboration with young judges and researchers plays a critical 
role. Justices gradually gain transnational insights reflected in their judgments. In 
recent decisions, the Court often designates a separate section titled “law of other 
states” in its decisions and discusses specific foreign law and a global trend on 
relevant topics. While the U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Roper28 and Lawrence29 
have been treated as pioneering and have brought about heated debates on citing 
foreign law for constitutional review, and South Africa’s Death Penalty case30 has 
                                                 
28 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
29 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 




been widely praised as a paradigmatic example of trans-judicial dialogues,31 such 
practice is a daily routine for the South Korean Constitutional Court.  
Reference to foreign law by the Court is conducted in a serious manner. The 
research judges’ reports not only discuss relevant constitutional law cases of other 
states, but also provide detailed introductions to the relevant foreign legal 
systems, supplemented by academic literature. The research judges interviewed 
by the author for this study agreed that their comparative research has a 
genuinely answer-seeking purpose and has real effects on the Court’s deliberation 
and decisionmaking process. This effective role of foreign rights practices stands 
in contrast to ex post facto justification, result-driven decoration, or “cherry 
picking”—a criticism typically leveled against referring to foreign law in judicial 
review.32  
Since comparative research is conducted in a routine and systemized manner, 
cases citing foreign law are common. A few examples are introduced here by way 
of illustration. In January 2014, the Court found the Public Official Election Law 
unconstitutional for disenfranchising prison inmates and those whose prison 
sentences have been suspended. In its opinion, under the subsection titled “law of 
other states,” the Court provided a detailed survey of relevant legislation in 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, and the 
United States.33 It also introduced decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the High Court 
of Australia, the Constitutional Council of France, and the European Court of 
Human Rights.34 This comparative discussion served as one of the important 
                                                 
31 E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 195 (2003). 
32 See e.g., Jeremy Waldron, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 171–86 
(2012). 
33 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2012 Hun-Ma 409 (Jan. 28, 2014). 
34 The research judge’s report for this case introduced relevant practices in forty-two European 
countries (discussed in the ECtHR Scoppola v. Italy case), along with a chart categorizing various 
countries’ practices, followed by detailed explanation of each category with relevant foreign court 
decisions, comments and recommendations by the UN Human Rights Committee, and the guidelines by 




grounds for the Court to find the domestic election law unconstitutional. In the 
Adultery case delivered in 2015,35 the Court began its reasoning, observing that “it 
is a global trend to decriminalize adultery,” and cited the earlier practices of 
abolishing adultery crimes in Argentina, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Japan, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. After conducting a proportionality review 
that followed, the Court invalidated the criminal law that punished a person who 
committed adultery with imprisonment, for violating the right to privacy and 
sexual self-determination. In the 2010 Death Penalty case,36 the Court mentioned 
that as of 2008, 105 states still had the death penalty system, while 36 of them had 
not executed anyone in the last 30 years and 92 states have abolished capital 
punishment. The absence of a dominant global trend provided one of the grounds 
for the Court to decide that sustaining a death penalty system does not go against 
with the right to life under the constitution.37 In 2014, the Court held that the law 
mandating military service only for male citizens was constitutional, pointing out 
that among more than 70 states that adopt a conscription system, few countries 
impose this duty on women. Recently, countries in Latin America and Asia have 
begun to appear more frequently in decisions.38 
2.  Transnational Activities Beyond the Courtroom  
The globalizing vision of the South Korean Constitutional Court is apparent also in 
its vibrant transnational activities outside the courtroom. The Court has made 
clear its ambitions to solidify a leadership position in Asia and to become a 
significant constituent of the global community of human rights and 
constitutional jurisprudence. South Korea is one of very few Asian states holding a 
                                                 
35 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2011 Hung-Ga 31 (Feb. 26, 2015). 
36 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2008 Hun-Ga 23 (Feb. 25, 2010). 
37 Constitutional Court of Korea, 2011 Hun-Ma 825 (Feb. 27, 2014). 
38 For example, in the Crime of Contempt case, the dissenting opinion cited the relevant practices of 
Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala. Constitutional Court of Korea, 2012 Hun-Ba 37 (Jun. 27, 
2013).  The Court increasingly cites the practice of Taiwan, China and other Asian countries in addition 




regular membership seat on the Venice Commission. In 2014, Korea hosted the 3rd 
Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, attended by the heads 
of constitutional courts, supreme courts, and equivalent organizations from 
almost 100 countries, under the theme of “Constitutional Justice and Social 
Integration.” In 2018, Korea will host a World Congress of the International 
Association of Constitutional Law. 
The former President of the Court, Park Han-Chul, who served in the position until 
January 2017, has expressed his enthusiasm for creating “the Asian Court of 
Human Rights” and hosting it in South Korea. As a preliminary step under his 
leadership, the South Korean Constitutional Court has led an effort to establish a 
network among Asian constitutional courts and their judges. In 2012, the Court 
hosted the Inaugural Congress of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts 
and Equivalent Institutions (AACC), with the theme of “Present and Future of 
Constitutional Justice in Asia.” The AACC is current joined by constitutional 
adjudication bodies from sixteen countries in Asia, including Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Uzbekistan. In 2016, the AACC board of members agreed that South Korea will host 
the permanent Research Secretariat of the Association.39  
The Court has been very active in hosting various international symposiums on 
constitutional jurisprudence and in inviting constitutional judges and scholars 
from abroad as short or mid-term visitors. It also regularly sends its research 
judges to parallel institutions or universities around the world to conduct 
research for extended periods. The Court’s English website provides a detailed 
introduction to the Court system and practice, updated news on its various 
transnational activities, and a searchable database of its important decisions and 
publications, fully translated into English.40 Taking a further step in this direction, 
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the Court launched the Constitutional Research Institute in 2011, a branch 
research institute undertaking extensive studies of various subjects from longer-
term academic and comparative perspectives.41 
3.  Self-Emancipation Through Transnational Engagement 
Comparativist critiques have a point worthy of attention when they criticize a 
self-centered manner of comparative law studies, which tend to interpret others’ 
realities with a bias rooted in comparatists’ own local context and culture,42 and 
often from a prejudiced “Western” view.43 “Distancing and differencing” are 
suggested as an alternative methodology to overcome this limitation.44 However, a 
question is raised whether it is possible to fully comprehend others’ local contexts 
“in their own right,” and if one does not or could not, then whether one fails to be 
a ‘good comparativist.’45 When local rights actors look at foreign practices to learn 
something meaningful, this process transforms self-understanding of the actors 
themselves as they continuously and openly engage with others and reflect on 
their own practice. Local comparatist actors’ own context and their evolving self-
identity also need to be taken seriously and without a bias.46 The above self-
                                                 
41 English website of the Institute: http://ri.ccourt.go.kr/eng/ccourt/main/index.jsp. 
42 E.g., Simone Glanert & Pierre Legrand, Law, Comparatism, and Epistemic Governance: There Is Critique 
And Critique (forthcoming, 2017) (noting “comparative research, no matter how intrinsically excellent, 
is always already a failure. … foreign law cannot meaningfully be formulated on its own terms but 
must be the result of an enunciation by the self in the self’s culture; foreign law … cannot generate a 
fixed or fixable meaning that would be independent from its interpreter’s cultural background...” and 
“that comparative law is epistemically doomed since the comparatist must fail to access or recount 
foreign law on its own terms”). See also Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16(2) LEGAL STUD. 232; 
FRANKENBERG, supra note 1, at 42 (“comparatists stay comfortably settled in their armchair, look out of 
the window with its ethnocentric frame and make the – necessarily distorted – foreign familiar, 
thereby domesticating tis foreignness and levelling diversity”). 
43 FRANKENBERG, supra note 1, at 85–104. 
44 Id. at 70–76. 
45 Id. at 42 (discussing “distancing and differencing … essential for a genuinely ‘good comparative 
practice’ – ‘good’ insofar as they are guided by self-criticism, inspired by curiosity about the foreign 
(law) and based on genuine interest in understanding unfamiliar/foreign/strange legal norms and 




critique by comparativists seems to reflect too much on a “Western” conscience to 
detach oneself from its imperialist past. Moreover, this line of critique seems to 
assume that only “Westerners” are conducting comparative work. More attention 
needs to be paid to how local actors in various non-Western parts of the world 
engage with comparative law. 
The comparativist critique that presumes a fixed and closed form of self-identity 
of a comparatist—mostly a “Western” self that consciously or unconsciously 
assumes oneself as a center or superior to others—does not apply to the 
experience of the South Korean Constitutional Court. The above survey of the 
Court’s engagement with foreign law over its last 27 years of practice and its 
recent transnational activities show how the self-identity of this local rights actor 
has evolved overtime—from local into cosmopolitan one. Unlike in the United 
States, engaging with foreign law is not widely seen as a threat to democratic 
sovereignty in South Korea,47 but is in fact conducted as a way of expressing and 
enhancing the transnationalizing self of national actors. For the South Korean 
Constitutional Court, referring to foreign rights practice has gradually evolved 
from a way of “catching up” with a handful of role-model countries, to extensive 
comparative research with a genuine answer-seeking function, as part of an effort 
to make more sound and persuasive judgments not only for the parties in the case, 
but also to a global audience. The Court’s transnational aspirations go further: to 
play a “standard setting” role in Asia, and to promote human rights across borders. 
The development that has emerged over time in South Korea exemplifies a story 
of birth and growth of a local rights actor attaining a cosmopolitan self-
                                                                                                                                               
46 Glanert and Legrand end their essay with remarks somewhat contradictory to their earlier 
discussion, by suggesting a positive potential of contextualized interpretation: “Because sheer 
duplication of foreign law is of no interest, interpretive enrichment in fact requires a comparative text 
that tells foreign law otherwise than on the law’s own terms. Only then can there be a conversation, a 
deliberation, or a negotiation of the kind that may allow for an amelioration of what understanding of 
the other (and of the self) is feasible and thus afford a more significant interpretive yield. Inadequacy 
is opportunity.” Glanert & Legrand, supra note 42. 
47 See e.g. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 




understanding as it becomes exposed to and engaged with the wider world of 
rights jurisprudence and practice.48 
The former and current justices of the Court interviewed by the author for this 
research agreed that the fundamental reason for referring to foreign rights 
practices is rooted in the universality of human rights and the common concerns 
retained by states about legitimate restrictions of rights, and that this 
engagement is made possible through a mutually comprehensible language of 
rights reasoning across jurisdictions.49 The Korean judges’ mindset supports the 
argument that regular reference to foreign rights practices does not necessarily 
pose a threat to the autonomy of a domestic constitution or a rights adjudication 
body, but can be an expression of and an effort to become a larger self. The South 
Korean Constitutional Court has transformed itself from its status as a follower 
and importer during the early stages of its jurisprudence, dependent on a few 
reference countries to fill the vacuum, to a regional leader and an autonomous 
and influential participant in global rights dialogues. This development has been 
achieved through active and continuous transnational engagement. 
Limitations also exist at the current stage of comparative law engagement around 
the globe as part of rights practice. Concerns are sound in terms of geographical 
imbalance. There are abundant cases in which Western democracies cite each 
other’s rights practice.50 Asian Courts frequently cite European and Anglo-
American cases, but things rarely work the other way around. Asian courts cite 
                                                 
48 See Slaughter, supra note 31, at 192 (discussing an emerging global community of courts based on 
“the self-awareness of the national and international judges who play as a part”). See also Jeremy 
Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005). 
49 These remarks by the judges confirm scholars’ account of factors and reasons for consulting rights 
jurisprudence in other jurisdictions. See e.g., Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: 
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 527–29 (2000) 
(discussing possible reasons why human rights cases entail greater use of foreign law than in other 
areas). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 
99 (1994). 
50 See Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
37 (2006) (discussing the practice among common law jurisdiction); Halmai, supra note 27, at 1331–34 
(discussing earlier U.S. practice); McCrudden, supra note 49, at 517–23 (discussing relevant factors such 
as the type of political regime in which the foreign court is situated; pedagogical impulse; perceived 




Western cases much more frequently than they refer to the practices of other 
Asian countries. However, a sign of change is also emerging in communication 
flows. As mentioned, the South Korean Constitutional Court has begun to cite the 
practice of Latin American and Asian states. The Taiwan Constitutional Court 
occasionally cites Korean examples. The South Korean Constitutional Court 
increasingly receives requests from other states and international bodies for an 
English translation or background information about the Court’s recent decisions. 
The Court’s vigorous transnational activities in recent years and its intensifying 
efforts in comparative study and global communication have raised the 
expectation that greater mutual and substantive rights dialogues will emerge 
between the West and Asia and among Asian jurisdictions for the coming years. 
Through continuous efforts for transnational comparative engagement, a local 
rights court in South Korea has overcome its colonial past dominated by a few 
influential states, has grown into a regional leader, and is gradually increasing its 
global role in cosmopolitan rights practice. This bottom-up, “self-emancipation” 
story of a local rights actor provides a counterexample to a generalized criticism 
that human rights and comparative law possess Western imperialist continuities.  
 Local Traditions Engaged with Universal Rights Norms  
Critiques on human rights and comparative law criticize that an obsession with 
the universal norm or the “Common Core” erases the diversity and specificity of 
the local contexts.51 It is at the same time doubtful however, that an assertion of 
“Asian values” could serve as a justification for denying universal human rights to 
any extent.52 The ways that tradition or national culture comes into rights 
practice are more subtle and varied. This section examines the cases in which 
domestic laws rooted in traditional values in a society have been challenged by 
citizens as oppressive of their human rights, while on the other hand, tradition 
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was also asserted by other groups as a justification for restricting rights. The 
following cases illustrate how the conflict between traditional values (under the 
influence of the Confucian history in East Asia) and human rights and principles 
as embodied in the constitution—adopted with the nation’s independence and 
modernization since 1945—have been exposed, deliberated and addressed 
through rights contestation and review processes. This case study exemplifies 
ways how contexts matter in the course of local rights actors’ engagement with 
universal norms and how a contextualized cosmopolitanism emerges from this 
engagement. 
1.  Cases 
If one has to pick the single most transformative decision made by the South 
Korean Constitutional Court so far, a likely candidate would be Household Head 
System (hojuje) decided in 2005.53 The household head system had constituted a 
foundation of Korean family law since its birth, representing and reproducing 
traditional social and family structures based on a brand of male supremacy 
rooted in the Confucian tradition. Under this system, every Korean citizen was 
registered as a member of a “household,” a basic unit of the society, which was 
comprised of a “house head,” the eldest male in a family, and his subordinated 
family members, including his mother, wife and children. This law made a female 
citizen belong to her father when she was born, to her husband when she got 
married, and then to her son when her husband died, while a male citizen was 
free to create his own household and serve as a head when married. This 
institutionalized patriarchal family system was unique among modern 
democracies. Along with legislative movements to abolish hojuje, a nationwide 
coalition of women’s rights and civil rights groups brought a constitutional claim 
to the Constitutional Court challenging this system.  
                                                 




After a series of open hearings and deliberation, the Court found the family law 
unconstitutional in violation of “individuals’ dignity and gender equality in 
family” under Article 36 paragraph 1 of the Constitution. The majority opinion 
took up the matter of the relationship between tradition and constitutional 
principles. The reasoning started with holding that “if the Constitution sustains a 
neutral position toward a family life and system, it might be desirable to respect a 
traditional family system unless it goes against other constitutional provisions. 
However, if the Constitution adopts certain values and principles with respect to a 
family life and system, especially in the period of political and social 
transformation [meaning the time when the First Constitution was adopted in 
1948], then those constitutional values and principles should be the supreme 
norm,” and “the role of family law is not limited to reflecting social reality. . . . It 
should confirm and disseminate the constitutional principle.” Then the Court 
discussed the relation between tradition and a democratic family system. It points 
to both Article 9 of the Constitution: “The State shall strive to sustain and develop 
the cultural heritage and to enhance national culture” and Article 36 paragraph 1: 
“Marriage and family life shall be entered into and sustained on the basis of 
individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the State shall do everything in 
its power to achieve that goal,” and emphasized the importance of making a 
harmonized interpretation of these two constitutional principles. The Court found 
that Article 36 paragraph 1 indicates a constitutional resolution to no longer 
acknowledge a longstanding patriarchal family order in the society. The Court 
articulated that the tradition mentioned in Article 9 is a concept with both 
historical and contemporary aspects, embracing the past as well as the present, 
and thus should be valid and reasonable under today’s standards. If a traditional 
order goes against constitutional values and principles, including individual 
dignity and gender equality, that tradition cannot be constitutionally justified by 
invoking Article 9. The Court then proceeded in its reasoning to find that the 
household head system is unconstitutional violating gender equality and 




In contrast, the dissenting opinion joined by two justices emphasized a 
constitutional duty to sustain and promote traditional culture, including the 
family system, which reflects “our unique and rational patrilineal tradition.” 
Reviewing the household head system with the proportionality test, the dissenting 
opinion argued that preserving a patrilineal family order can serve as a legitimate 
government purpose, in light of the state’s duty to uphold traditions under Article 
9. The justices then found that the household head system met the necessity and 
the narrow balancing requirements, with an opinion that the wife-belongs-to-
husband family practice has been taken for granted for a long time in a patrilineal 
society and that this reality has not changed much until today, and that this 
family system does not bring about substantively discriminatory effects against 
women. After this court decision, an entirely new, digitalized and individualized 
citizen registration system was developed and began to operate in South Korea. 
Every Korean citizen is now registered as an individual, neither as a household 
head nor a member subject to a head. 
Another transformative case decided prior to the above case lies in the same vein. 
Korean family law has long prohibited marriage between citizens who have the 
same family name and origin. This law was based on the tradition of an 
agriculture society with an extended family system, combined with the Confucian 
and patriarchal social order. Under this law, about four million people whose 
family name is Kim with the same regional origin, but without any close family 
ties, were not allowed to marry each other. In 1997, the Court found this law 
unconstitutional in violation of human dignity and the right to pursue happiness 
as well as the gender equality principle under the Constitution.54 The Court 
emphasized that the tradition and social order themselves change over time, and 
the basis for this law had already lost its legitimacy as a tradition protected under 
the boundary of Article 9. The Court also noted that this type of prohibition had 
been abolished in China, where this tradition originated, as early as 1930s. The 
Court did not go further with the proportionality test, finding that preserving an 
                                                 




outdated social order cannot be a legitimate government purpose to restrict 
constitutional rights. On the other hand, two dissenting justices took the position 
that citizens’ constitutional rights and equality are protected within the boundary 
of the tradition. They regarded that preserving the social order by enforcing a 
traditional marriage custom was a legitimate state reason to restrict rights and 
equality, and that the extent of rights restriction under this law was not excessive. 
The Confusion tradition and ethics appear in the criminal (procedural) law as well. 
The Korean Criminal Procedure Law prohibits a person from suing one’s 
parents/grandparents or parents/grandparents in law for criminal charges.55 This 
law is rooted in the traditional Confusion ethics of ‘hyo,’ a filial duty to one’s 
parents. Five justices found this law unconstitutional, but the Court could not 
reach six votes, a required number to invalidate any law or government actions in 
Korea.56 Reviewing the provision under the proportionality principle, the five 
justices viewed that depriving a crime victim of the right to sue an offender, for 
the purpose of preserving a family order based on the Confusion tradition (the 
purpose of which the judges regarded as legitimate), violates the right to equality 
of those whose lineal ascendants are criminal offenders. The other four justices 
regarded this law as constitutional, with the following rationale: that a crime 
victim’s right to sue is not a constitutional right but a mere legal right under 
criminal procedure law; that the legislature thus holds broad discretion to 
regulate this right while taking into account the nation’s own judicial culture, 
ethics and tradition; that Confucian traditions and ethics remain still valid today, 
especially regarding the relationship between direct ascendants and descendants, 
for which traditional culture and ethics should play more decisive roles than legal 
regulation; and that among those ethics, respect for one’s parents has been 
considered as the supreme moral value, and the law embodying this value has a 
rational basis for discrimination. 
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2.  Implications 
The cases discussed above illustrate how traditions encounter universal human 
rights norms embodied in constitutional rights and principles. The rights review 
process serves as a venue to expose, deliberate and resolve conflicts and tensions 
between individual rights and traditional values or orders of society embedded in 
the law. Their dynamics are more complex than a dichotomous confrontation 
between universal human rights and cultural relativism.57 Traditions are 
contested through a self-reflective, justificatory rights reasoning process.58 
Restrictive laws rooted in traditions need stronger justificatory grounds than the 
assertion that the law serves traditional values or conventional social order.59 A 
rights contestation process deconsecrates long-standing traditions in society and 
requires justification in terms rights, equality and other constitutional 
principles.60 
In the context of the South Korean constitution, the dynamics between rights and 
traditions wear more layers, as the Constitution provides for succeeding and 
developing traditions as a constitutional duty of the state (Article 9). The 
Constitutional Court in the first two cases addressed this tension by interpreting 
traditions in the contemporary context—excluding oppressive and outdated 
customs from the definition of tradition to be upheld under Article 9. Finding that 
preserving a patriarchal social order cannot serve as a legitimate purpose to 
restrict rights and equality, the Court did not have to proceed any further with the 
proportionality test.61 On the other hand, the dissenting justices regarded that 
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sustaining a traditional family order can serve as a legitimate purpose for 
restricting rights, backing up their position with the Article 9 duty. However, their 
proportionality reviews lack detailed and thorough reasoning. In the last case, five 
out of nine justices also tried to address the tension through proportionality 
reasoning. While these justices deemed upholding a filial duty to one’s parents as a 
legitimate purpose of law, they found the law unconstitutional because it 
excessively restricted rights. The other four justices refused to review the law 
under the proportionality test, emphasizing the legislature’s discretion to regulate 
this issue. 
These cases exemplify the ways that tension and conflict between universal rights 
norms and local traditions are deliberated and reasoned through a nation’s 
internal rights contestation and adjudication process. The majority opinions in 
each case make clear that a tradition or custom that does not uphold today’s 
values and principles cannot provide justifications for restricting rights and 
equality. Even if some traditional values have continuing merits for contemporary 
society (such as ‘hyo’ in the last case), the law based on those traditions needs to 
be justified through a further balancing test. Unlike the comparativists’ critique 
that universalist norms and “normalization” of reality into the language of rights 
flatten and erase specificity and diversity of the local context,62 the actual rights 
practice in this local jurisdiction points to the opposite direction: the local 
context’s specificity and complexities are brought to light, examined and 
deliberated through a rights reasoning process conducted in a thorough, 
transparent, and self-reflective manner. Contexts are not erased but revived 
through this rights practice. As specificity and complexities of reality are 
reasoned through a rights review process, the practice attains a contextualized 
cosmopolitan character with a capacity to accommodate both the locality of 
contexts and the universality of rights. These practices also demonstrate the 
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emancipatory potential of the rights contestation and adjudication process for the 
individuals whose rights and equality have been denied under the name of 
tradition and national culture. Without such a rights review process, tradition 
could have more readily served as a uncontested justificatory tool by a dominant 
group to sustain oppressive law and social order. The cases examined in this 
section provides further examples of self-emancipatory and empowering stories 
achieved through rights actors’ serious engagement with its own local context in 
light of universal norms, which are themselves concretized and contextualized in 
the process. 
 Individual Empowerment: Bottom-up and Contextualized Cosmopolitan 
Rights Practice  
This section revisits the South Korean rights practices discussed thus far, 
reflecting on popular criticisms against human rights law as a static, top-down, 
elitist, and Anglo-Eurocentric enterprise that tends to alienate ordinary 
individuals.63  
The previous sections examined the emerging human rights practice in South 
Korea with contextualized cosmopolitan features, focusing on role of the 
Constitutional Court as one of its key actors. However, the primary beneficiaries of 
cosmopolitan rights practice are not the courts or states, but every rights-bearing 
individual. As discussed in the last section, cosmopolitan rights practice can have 
an emancipatory effect for individuals, and this potential entails multiple 
dimensions of empowerment. Individual citizens and non-citizens are empowered 
by the adoption of the list of human rights in their constitution and an effectively 
functioning mechanism to contest these rights, challenging unreasonable or 
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oppressive laws and government actions.64 International human rights norms and 
other jurisdictions’ rights practices further empower these individuals by 
providing them with additional grounds for requiring justifications for state 
actions that deviate from global norms or practice. This transnational rights 
practice mobilizes the individual to grow into cosmopolitan rights-bearers acting 
locally with global minds. Thus, through the rights review system with 
transnational features, individuals are empowered not only as beneficiaries of 
cosmopolitan rights practice, but also as its crucial actors. Recall the claimants in 
the cases discussed so far: women subordinated to men under the household head 
system; “comfort women” ignored by both Japanese and Korean governments; 
migrant workers abused by the discriminatory foreign labor system; 
disenfranchised prisoners and convicts; and conscientious objectors incarcerated, 
among numerous others who have been oppressed, discriminated, and 
marginalized by laws about which they had very little say. Through the rights 
review system, these individuals are empowered to bring a case, require 
justifications, engage in rights debates, and often bring about transformative 
outcomes toward a more free, equal and just society. Through this empowerment 
process, these individuals grow into central actors who drive and develop bottom-
up and contextualized cosmopolitan rights practice.65 Cosmopolitanizing rights 
practice led by empowered ordinary citizens and non-citizens in this local 
jurisdiction provides powerful grounds for challenging the criticism that human 
rights law is a static, elitist, top-down, and West-centric enterprise. 
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Individuals are not the only group empowered and mobilized by the 
cosmopolitanizing rights review system. The Korean example demonstrates how 
the court and the individual can mobilize and empower each other. In many cases, 
it is individual applicants who inform the Court of relevant international human 
rights norms and foreign practices. Increasingly, lawyers and NGOs supporting the 
applicants intensively research and invoke international and foreign human 
rights law as grounds for their constitutional claims. The rights practice by 
globally motivated private actors drives the Court to respond to their 
transnational rights claims when deliberating and writing its decisions. The Court 
justices regularly ask their research judges to conduct further research on 
relevant international norms and foreign practices in addition to the ones invoked 
by applicants. The Court also has its own transnational aspirations of playing a 
leadership role in Asia and beyond. The Court’s global engagement further 
mobilizes individuals, lawyers and civil society to engage in transnational human 
rights practices more earnestly, which again informs the Court and advances its 
practice. Thus multiple aspects of bottom-up rights practices are developing in 
and through this rights review system: from individual rights-holders to the 
court; from young research judges to senior justices; from the local to the 
transnational. This phenomenon has been initiated and has developed not through 
top-down preaching by Western elite groups, but through local actors’ 
transnational self-awareness and constant justice-seeking efforts. 
Conclusion 
The rights practice in South Korea examined from multiple angles in this work 
exemplifies bottom-up and contextualized cosmopolitan human rights practice, 
which has grown locally outside of the West. This development has been advanced 
by local rights actors—the constitutional court with transnational aspirations, 
and the global-minded rights-claiming individuals. Their dynamic engagements 
with international and foreign human rights law facilitate more comprehensive 




ideas of rights and self are also embedded in the practice of rethinking tradition 
and national culture in rights terms, taking seriously the locality as well as the 
universality of rights. The meaning and operation of universal rights norms are 
concretized and contextualized by local actors’ constant transnational 
engagement. Existing tensions and struggles indicate the transformation and 
widening of the rights practice in progress. It is a living process that brings about 
self-emancipation and empowerment. 
Nothing in my argument in this paper suggests that I take the concept of human 
rights or rights practices by and through rights review courts as a silver bullet to 
all problems either nationally or internationally. However, rights ground a wide 
range of emancipatory practices across the world, whether by individuals and civil 
society, or state and international institutions, which any serious critique of 
rights needs to engage with. The result of such engagement would be more 
grounded critiques of specific features of concrete rights practices, probably 
geared towards their improvement, rather than their abandonment in favor of 
something entirely different. Self-critiques raised by (Western) human rights and 
comparativist lawyers can be benefited from this contextualized story of self-
empowerment achieved through cosmopolitan rights practice in a jurisdiction 
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